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The	passage	 raises	 a	 question	 that	 suggests,	 almost	 immediately,	










can	 see	 that	 I	 say	 the	 very	 opposite,	 that	 I	 don’t	 envy	
anyone,	that	I’m	perfectly	satisfied	with	what	my	life	has	
been,	that	I’ve	kept	all	my	promises	and	that	consequently	



















Not	 all	 decisions	 are	 like	 this.	 If	 I	 had	 to	 choose	 between	 fifty	
dollars	and	a	hundred,	I	would	choose	the	hundred,	and	while	I	might	
wish	that	I	could	have	more,	it	would	make	no	sense	to	feel	dismay	
















not	 obtain,	 the	 degree	 of	 love	 appropriate	 to	 it	 depends	 on	 the	 degree	 to	
which	its	obtaining	is	a	close	possibility”	(Hurka	1996:	559–60).	But	Hurka	















































When	 one	 has	 an	 existentialist	 view	 of	 the	world,	 like	
mine,	 the	 paradox	 of	 human	 life	 is	 precisely	 that	 one	
tries	to	be	and,	in	the	long	run,	merely	exists.	It’s	because	
of	 this	discrepancy	that	when	you’ve	 laid	your	stake	on	
being	—	and,	 in	 a	 way	 you	 always	 do	 when	 you	 make	
plans,	even	if	you	actually	know	that	you	can’t	succeed	in	
being	—	when	you	turn	around	and	look	back	on	your	life,	






does	 in	 living	 it,	 to	have	an	enduring	presence	 that	 the	 completion	















for	 another.	 And	 so	 it	 applies	 to	me.	 Philosopher,	 poet,	 physician:	
these	lives	realize	different	values;	the	reasons	to	want	them	are	not	
the	same.	While	the	case	for	being	a	philosopher	may	not	outweigh	
the	 reasons	 to	prefer	 those	other	 lives,	 it	 is	 good	enough.	 I	 do	not	
regret	my	 choice	 if	 that	means	 thinking	 I	made	 a	mistake,	 at	 least	


















dimension	 to	 this	 response.	 As	 Derek	 Parfit	 showed,	 when	 their	
objects	are	patterns	of	experience,	our	preferences	are	“biased	towards	
the	 future”	 (Parfit	 1984:	 165–7).	 In	 Parfit’s	 example,	 I	 wake	 up	with	
















The	second	clarification	is	especially	urgent	 in	 light	of	what	 is	 to	
come.	When	I	say	that,	before	I	made	the	decision,	I	did	not	know	what	




Finally,	 although	 I	 believe	 that	 nostalgia	 for	 lost	 alternatives	 is	







whose	 extinction	 we	 should	 mourn.	 (Section	 II	 will	 dwell	 on	 the	
distinctive	worth	of	people,	 the	value	of	 their	 existence,	 in	 contrast	
with	the	value	of	other	things.)
That	 nostalgia	 has	 an	 epistemic	 origin	 is	 confirmed	 when	 we	
divorce	the	condition	of	ignorance	from	its	temporal	baggage.	Suppose,	
for	instance,	that	I	am	struck	by	retrograde	amnesia.	I	know	that	I	am	
at	midlife,	 that	 I	 am	a	 philosopher,	 poet,	 or	 physician,	 but	 I	 do	not	
remember	 which.	 I	 feel	 a	 certain	 excitement,	 an	 urgent	 curiosity.	 I	




In	order	 to	make	sense	of	 this,	we	must	 take	up	a	neglected	 fact	
about	the	way	in	which	reasons	work.	The	fact	is	that	there	is	a	great	

































lived	 derives	 from	 the	 plurality	 of	 reasons	 or	 values,	 there	 is	more	








you	can	 fail	 to	regret	your	mistakes.	You	may	affirm	your	actual	 life,	
and	the	events	that	made	it	possible,	even	when	you	think	you	would	
have	lived	a	better	life	if	things	had	gone	otherwise.	Can	this	be	right?	
I	will	argue	 that	 these	 issues	are	connected:	 the	scope	of	Specificity	
and	 the	 limits	 of	 regret.	 If	 retrospective	 affirmation	 is	 rational,	 it	 is	




Begin	with	 a	much-discussed	 case.7	 You	 have	 a	 condition	 that	 will	




conceive	a	 child	now,	and	your	decision	will	not	 affect	 the	number	















am	not	 in	 a	 position	 to	 feel	 disappointment,	 yet,	 about	missing	 the	
musician	or	the	play.	That	changes	when	the	tickets	are	revealed.	Now	I	
feel	a	sense	of	loss,	and	a	corresponding	envy	of	the	time	before	I	knew.





than	the	reasons	 for	 the	other,	so	 that	 it	 is	 rational	 to	be	 indifferent	




In	Ruth	Chang’s	 terminology,	 the	 relation	between	your	 reasons	
to	want	tickets	to	the	concert	and	your	reasons	to	want	tickets	to	the	














structure,	 one’s	 affirmative	 attitude	 spreads	 backward	





affirmation	 is	 to	 consider	 in	 turn	 each	 causal	 antecedent	 of	 N’s	
existence,	and	to	ask:	What	do	I	now	prefer?	That	it	took	place,	leading	
to	N’s	existence?	Or	not?	Would	I	rewind	time	and	change	the	past	if	









Does	 that	 ring	 true?	 It	 depends	 on	what	 would	 have	 happened	
otherwise.	 If	 there	 would	 have	 been	 a	 great	 reduction	 in	 human	
suffering	and	injustice,	I	do	not	think	I	can	prefer	that	the	Holocaust	
have	taken	place,	so	that	I	and	my	son	exist.	With	regret	but	without	
incoherence,	 I	prefer	that	 it	had	not.	 If	 the	alternative	is	some	other	
atrocity,	this	may	change.	Either	way,	these	questions	of	counterfactual	






























existence	 of	 those	 who	 now	 exist	 (Setiya	 2014c).	 Second,	 Wallace	
holds	 that	when	we	 are	 attached	 to	 another	 person,	 or	 to	 our	 own	
existence,	it	becomes	an	object	of	“unconditional	affirmation”:
One	does	not	merely	affirm	these	objects,	given	that	the	
necessary	 causal	 conditions	 for	 them	 obtained;	 rather,	
one	 is	 glad	 on	 balance	 that	 those	 objects	 are	 in	 fact	
part	of	the	history	of	the	world,	taking	into	account	the	



















attachment	 to	 things	other	 than	people,	 to	activities	or	objects,	 like	
Orlando,	masterpiece	that	it	is,	can	change	what	it	is	rational	to	want,	
so	 that	one	 is	 sheltered	 from	 regret.	Woolf’s	 life	does	not	present	 a	
perfect	case	for	answering	this	question,	in	part	because	it	is	not	clear	
that	she	made	a	mistake	in	not	having	children,	or	that	she	thinks	she	









would	 benefit,	 overall,	 from	 receiving	 the	 implants:	 his	 life	 will	 be	
worse	without	them.	The	parents	should	prefer	the	operation,	but	they	
decide	against	 it.	Years	 later,	 looking	back	on	 this	mistake,	Harman	
argues	that	it	may	be	rational	for	the	parents	not	to	feel	regret,	even	
though,	“as	things	actually	are,	they	are	impersonally	worse,	worse	for	














decision	or	 event	 leads	 to	 the	 existence	of	 a	 particular	 person	who	










We	 came	 back	 from	Rodmell	 yesterday,	&	 I	 am	 in	 one	
of	my	moods,	 as	 the	 nurses	 used	 to	 call	 it,	 today.	 And	
what	 is	 it	&	why?	A	 desire	 for	 children,	 I	 suppose;	 for	
Nessa’s	life;	for	the	sense	of	flowers	breaking	all	around	
me	involuntarily.	[…]	Years	&	years	ago,	after	the	Lytton	
affair,	 I	 said	 to	 myself,	 walking	 up	 the	 hill	 at	 Beireuth,	






Consider,	 then,	 the	 life	 of	 a	 deaf	 person,	 as	 it	 appears	 from	 her	
own	perspective.	In	a	path-breaking	article,	Robert	Adams	took	up	the	
remarkable	case	of	Helen	Keller,	arguing	 that	 she	should	not	 regret	
her	childhood	illness.13





true).	But	whatever	 its	excellences,	 that	 life	would	not	
have	had	one	day	 in	 it	 that	would	have	been	very	 like	
any	 day	 of	 her	 actual	 life	 after	 the	 age	 of	 19	 months.	






concrete	 content	—	that	 she	 cared	 about	 in	 her	 actual	














The	 deaf	 child’s	 parents	 could	 grant	 that	 things	 would	
have	 been	 better	 if	 their	 child	 had	 not	 been	 deaf.	 But	
things	would	have	been	very different.	They	feel	that	they	
would	 have	 then	 had	 a	 different child	—	not	 numerically	
a	different	child,	but	a	child	with	a	completely	different	
personality,	 character,	 and	 sense	 of	 self	 from	 the	 child	
they	actually	have.	In	loving	their	child,	they	love	who	he	
has	become.	They	are	glad	he	has	become	who	he	is,	they	
value	him	 as	 he	 is,	 and	 they	 cannot	 prefer	 that	 he	had	
come	 to	 be	 so	 different	—	indeed,	 they	 prefer	 things	 as	
they	are.	Surely	these	preferences	are	utterly	reasonable.	
(Harman	2009:	185)
These	preferences	may	be	 reasonable,	 but	 they	 seem	very	 different,	
and	much	more	 puzzling,	 than	 your	 preference	not	 to	 have	waited,	




sense	 to	 prefer	 one’s	 twenty-year-old	 deaf	 child	 as she is	 because	
one	 loves	her	as she is”,	weighing	your	attachment	 to	her	distinctive	
character	more	strongly	than	her	own	well-being	(Harman	2009:	187)?	
Shouldn’t	parental	love	be	more	selfless	than	that?
A	 complication	 here	 is	 that	 the	 parents’	 preference	 is,	 in	 part,	









There	 are	 two	 final	 complications	 to	 set	 aside.	 The	 first	 is	 risk	




becoming	 a	 doctor,	 I	must	 factor	 in	 uncertainty	 about	 the	 outcome,	




The	 second	 complication	 is	 personal	 attachment.	 One	 way	 in	
which	my	 life	 would	 have	 been	 different	 if	 I	 had	 been	 a	 doctor	 is	
that	 I	would	 have	met	 different	 people.	 I	would	 have	 had	 different	
friends,	a	different	wife	or	child,	or	none	at	all.	It	may	be	rational	to	
form	attachments	 to	particular	people	 in	which	one	would	prefer	 a	
relationship	with	 them	at	some	cost	 to	one’s	own	well-being	over	a	



















is	 far	 from	obvious	 that	Helen	Keller	would	have	 lived	a	better	and	
happier	 life	 if	 her	 illness	 had	 not	 left	 her	 deaf	 and	 blind.	 Her	 life	









this	 dispute.	 We	 can	 do	 so	 by	 engaging	 in	 some	 counterfactual	





unable	 to	 follow	 through	—	and	 so	 I	 took	 philosophy	 instead.	 My	
discomfort	with	blood	was	not	enough	to	justify	my	choice,	nor	did	
I	 think	otherwise.	My	action	was	akratic.	But	 it	shaped	my	future	 in	
pervasive	ways.	 I	know	a	great	deal	about	 life	as	a	philosopher,	 the	
highs	and	lows	of	teaching	and	research,	the	collegiality	and	frustration.	
I	know	much	less	about	medicine.	Now	I	 look	back	on	my	decision.	
Life	 in	philosophy	has	been	good,	overall.	But	 I	 still	 think	 I	made	a	




know	that	 it	 is	not	the	best.	While	 it	may	be	rational	 to	choose	an	inferior	
option	when	you	do	not	know	what	the	best	option	is,	it	seems	irrational	to	
prefer	an	option	you	know	is	not	the	best	when	you	know,	of	some	specific	







Begin	 with	 artifacts,	 like	 Woolf’s	 Orlando.	 Does	 their	 actuality	
affect	what	it	is	rational	to	want?	I	do	not	think	it	does.	Imagine	two	






B	does	not.	Does	 this	affect	what	 it	 is	 rational	 to	want?	Could	 it	 tip	
the	balance,	 so	 that	 you	now	have	 sufficient	 reason	 to	be	glad	 that	
A	exists?	Shouldn’t	you	prefer	 to	 rewind	 time,	 if	B	would	 then	exist	
instead	 of	A?	 I	would	 say	 so.	Now	 imagine	 that	 you	 know	nothing	




We	 must	 not	 be	 distracted,	 here,	 by	 the	 conservative	 attitude	
embraced	by	 Jerry	Cohen	 in	his	 “defence	of	 existing	value”	 (Cohen	
2011).	 Cohen’s	 conservative	 declines	 to	 replace	 existing	 valuable	
things	—	institutions,	 works	 of	 art,	 etc.	—	with	 ones	 that	 would	 be	
slightly	 better,	 in	 that	 we	 should	 prefer	 the	 replacements	 to	 what	
actually	exists	if	we	were	starting	from	scratch.	This	attitude	may	be	
rational,	 but	 it	 is	 not	what	we	 are	 considering.	 The	 issue	 raised	 by	
conservatism	is	whether	to	preserve	existing	things	or	to	destroy	and	
replace	 them.	We	 compare	 two	 futures,	 holding	 the	past	 fixed,	 and	
ask	which	there	 is	 reason	to	prefer.	My	question	 is	different.	 It	calls	
for	a	comparison	of	two	world-histories	including	changes	in	the	past	



























For	 these	 philosophers,	 actual	 projects	 are	 like	 actual	 relationships	
or	 actual	 people:	 their	 existence	 alters	 the	 landscape	 of	 reasons,	
changing	what	 it	 is	 rational	 to	want.	Thus	Harman	 (2015)	writes	of	
our	 “reasonable	 attachment	 to	 the	 actual”,	 as	 if	 it	 were	 a	 pervasive	
orientation	 to	 what	 matters.	 I	 am	 sceptical.	 Wallace	 may	 be	 right	
that	“[actual]	human	beings	[…]	make	claims	on	us	[…]	that	merely	






a	 conservative	 attitude	 to	 one’s	 existing	 projects.	 This	 may	 reflect	
concern	for	the	integrity	of	one’s	commitments	or	the	narrative	arc	of	
life,	and	it	may	be	rational.	But	again,	it	is	not	what	we	are	considering.	
Concern	 for	 narrative	 would	 make	 sense	 of	 a	 desire	 to	 complete	







actual	 existence	 have	 the	 significance	 it	 does	 when	 you	 conceive	
and	give	birth	to	N.	In	Kantian	terms,	while	human	lives	have	dignity,	
activities	 and	 artifacts	 have	 price:	 their	 value	 can	 be	 replaced.	 It	 is	
the	dignity	of	human	life	that	explains	why	you	should	not	prefer	to	
rewind	time,	erase	your	son,	and	try	again.	Nothing	like	this	applies	
to	 the	activities	 that	make	up	your	 life	and	the	artifacts	 that	engage	





We	 can	make	 progress	 by	 noting	 that,	 ordinarily,	 two	 things	 go	
together:	 actuality	 and	 specific	 knowledge.	When	 I	 have	 to	 choose	
between	 two	options,	A	 and	B,	 such	 that	B	 is	 better	 and	A	 is	what	
20.	For	a	defence	of	this	claim,	see	Kelly	2004.
21.	 This	 argument	 bears	 on	 the	 rationality	 of	 “adaptive	 preference	 change”,	 in	
which	one	ceases	to	desire	activities	or	outcomes	in	response	to	their	being	

















balance	of	 reasons.	That	 is	not	possible.	Nor	 is	 the	point	specific	 to	
reasons	for	acting.	The	actuality	of	a	project	does	not	give	reasons	for	
preference	or	intensify	the	reasons	that	were	already	there.	It	would	









It	 cannot	 tip	 the	 balance	 from	 decisive	 reason	 for	 preferring	 B	 to	
sufficient	reason	for	preferring	A,	as	when	I	decide	to	be	a	philosopher,	
not	a	physician.	
Again,	 it	 is	crucial	 to	distinguish	the	phenomenon	I	am	rejecting,	
which	 concerns	 one’s	 retrospective	 preference,	 from	 a	 merely	
prospective	 shift.	 There	 is	 the	 idea	 that,	 once	 you	 have	 invested	





















This	 is	 not	 just	 a	 point	 about	 strange	 counterfactuals.	 Specificity	
would	explain	why	the	circumstance	of	deaf	parents	deciding	about	
cochlear	 implants	 for	 their	 child	 is	 quite	 unlike	 that	 of	 parents	
with	 typical	 hearing.	 The	 deaf	 parents	 are	 in	 a	 position	 to	 engage	










back	 on	 my	 mistake	 in	 deciding	 to	 take	 philosophy,	 I	 am	 moved	






become	a	philosopher,	 I	 end	up	knowing	an	awful	 lot	 about	what	
is	 involved	 in	doing	philosophy;	 I	 know	much	 less	 about	 life	 as	 a	
doctor.	The	arguments	above	abstract	from	this.	Thus,	in	comparing	
painting	A	 to	painting	B,	 I	had	you	vividly	 imagine	both,	or	know	



















reasons	 to	prefer	B	 in	prospect	were	not	much	stronger.	 If	anything	
makes	 this	 rational,	 it	 is	 Specificity.	 You	 respond	 more	 strongly	 to	






for	 one	 night	 only.	 Although	 the	 exhibit	 looks	 interesting,	 there	 is	
decisive	reason	to	prefer	the	alternatives.	I	place	tickets	to	the	museum	














Does	 Specificity	 work	 this	 way?	 Here	 my	 thoughts	 give	 out.	 I	







Is	 regret	 so	 awful?	 Should	 we	 devote	 such	 diligent	 reflection	 to	
avoiding	or	containing	it?	More	to	the	point,	should	I?




so	preferring)	 in	ways	 that	 conflict	with	 false	beliefs	 about	 the	balance	of	
reasons;	it	is	distinctive	of	our	examples	that	the	conflicting	belief	is	true.
but	 by	 a	 richly	 textured	 knowledge	 of	what	 is	 good	 about	 a	 life	 as	
a	philosopher.	 I	 lack	 such	knowledge	of	 the	 reasons	 to	be	 a	doctor,	
something	I	know	about	only	in	general	terms.	It	 is	not	that,	having	
decided	on	philosophy,	there	is	new	reason	to	prefer	that	life,	as	there	






preference	 is	 irrational.	 But	 it	 involves	 an	 application	 of	 Specificity	
much	 more	 radical	 than	 those	 in	 section	 I.	 In	 cases	 of	 normative	
parity,	it	is	rational	to	be	more	strongly	moved	by	one	consideration	
than	another,	despite	your	knowledge	that	it	is	not	a	stronger	reason.	









will	 result	 from	a	 choice,	 but	 of	what	 the	outcomes	 are.	Here	 is	 an	
analogy:	Think	back	to	the	choice	of	tickets	and	suppose	that,	as	well	
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